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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation studies firm’s decisions on inventory investment and innovation 
activities. The first chapter examines firm inventory behavior. It resolves and simulates 
the production smoothing/buffer stock model using different sets of parameters. It shows 
that the relationship between a sales shock and inventory investment could be ambiguous 
which is different from previous predictions. The production smoothing/buffer stock 
model and the (S, s) model of inventory are tested using a rich Chinese firm-level dataset 
covering 769 manufacturing firms from 1980 to 1989, and I find that sales are positively 
correlated with inventory for raw materials, but negatively correlated with finished goods 
inventory in most cases. These findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions 
from the production smoothing/buffer stock model and the (S, s) model, contradicting 
previous test results. The second chapter examines the relationship between process 
innovation and market competition. I find that increased competition will shrink the 
demand facing each firm, and firms will have less incentive for process innovation 
whether the innovation outcome is deterministic or stochastic. However, when the 
number of firms in the market is proportional to the demand and both increase, then 
increased price elasticity will induce firms to devote more effort to conduct process 
innovation when innovation is deterministic; and under the stochastic case an inverted-U 
shape relation between innovation effort and market competitiveness is identified. 
Furthermore, when the number of firms is endogenous, the innovation incentive grows 
with the size of the market. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Understanding firm’s behavior is very important to both market participants and 
social planners. In this dissertation, I will study firm’s decisions on inventory investment 
and innovation activities.  
In chapter one, I examine inventory behavior using Chinese firm level data. 
Inventory investment is of great economic significance at both the macro and micro 
levels. At the macro level, it has been long regarded as a key determinant of business 
cycles, and macroeconomists often recognize inventory as a destabilizing factor which 
generates economic cycles that would otherwise not exist. At the micro level, however, 
inventories are held for various reasons to stabilize a firm’s operation. For instance, 
manufacturers store raw materials to shorten future delivery lags and smooth production; 
wholesalers and retailers keep sufficient inventory to avoid running out of stock. Many 
firms devote a significant amount of time and effort to inventory management. Various 
models emerge to explain inventory behavior, and among them, the production 
smoothing/buffer stock model prevailed in the early literature. This chapter examines 
firm inventory behavior. I resolve and simulate the production smoothing/buffer stock 
model using different sets of parameters, and it is shown that the relation between a sales 
shock and inventory investment could be ambiguous which differs from predictions in the 
literature. The production smoothing/buffer stock model and the (S, s) model of inventory 
are then tested using a rich Chinese firm-level dataset covering 769 manufacturing firms 
from 1980 to 1989, and I found that sales are positively correlated with inventory for raw 
materials, but negatively correlated with finished goods inventory in most cases. These 
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findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions from the production 
smoothing/buffer stock model and the (S, s) model, but contradicts many previous 
empirical findings.  
In chapter two, the relationship between innovative activities and market 
competition is modeled and analyzed. The debate over the effect of increasing market 
competition on firms’ innovation activities has been controversial since Schumpeter 
(1934). Competition is one of a great many factors that affect a firm’s incentive to 
innovate, such as the market structure, the protection of property rights, the ability to 
license, uncertainty regarding innovation processes and so on. Market competition can 
interact with these other factors, but there is no single model that captures every aspect of 
innovation and competition, and therefore the theoretic literature arrives at no consensus 
regarding the effects of competition on innovation. Generally, the theoretical literature 
examines the relation between innovation and competition with the level of competition 
being simply represented by the number of firms which is assumed to be exogenous. 
However, in reality the number of firms in a market is determined by market size, scale 
economies and other factors such as fixed costs and barriers to entry. For instance, as the 
size of the market grows, typically more firms will enter the market to capture available 
profits. Thus, I argue an important step in this literature is to allow the number of firms to 
be endogenous in a free entry model with zero profit-equilibrium. In this chapter, I first 
examine how competition affects innovation effort when the number of firms in the 
market is proportional to market demand. In this case, the number of firms grows at the 
same rate as the size of the market so that the number of customers facing each firm stays 
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the same. This model allows me to illustrate how competition affects innovation while 
neutralizing the scale effect. Then I analyze the effect of competition on innovation when 
there is a fixed cost involved in the production. Thus the number of firms in the market 
under free entry is endogenously determined by a zero-profit condition. I find that 
increased competition will shrink the demand facing each firm, and firms will have less 
incentive for process innovation whether the innovation outcome is deterministic or 
stochastic. However, when the number of firms in the market is proportional to the 
demand and they both increase, increased price elasticity will induce firms to devote 
more effort to conduct process innovation when innovation is deterministic; and in the 
case of stochastic innovation an inverted-U shape relation between innovation effort and 
market competitiveness is identified. Furthermore, when the number of firms is 
endogenous, the innovation incentive grows with the size of the market. 
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CHAPTER I 
A REEXAMINATION OF INVENTORY BEHAVIOR USING 
CHINESE FIRM-LEVEL DATA 
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 I wish to thank my advisor, Dr. Gilpatric, for enormous help on this. I also owe to 
Dr. Wanamaker, Dr. Shaur, Dr. Celeste and Dr. Petrie for their insightful comments and 
generous support. I presented this paper on the brownbag workshop of my department, 
and I thank all those who provided helpful suggestions. 
Abstract  
  
This paper resolves and simulates the production smoothing/buffer stock model 
using different sets of parameters. I show that the relation between a sales shock and 
inventory investment could be ambiguous which is different from previous predictions. 
The production smoothing/buffer stock model and the (S, s) model of inventory are tested 
using a rich Chinese firm-level dataset covering 769 manufacturing firms from 1980 to 
1989.  Two main results are found. First, the variance of the annual gross output is 
smaller than that of the sales revenue. In particular, small firms in heavy industry show 
strong evidence of using inventory to smooth production and buffer demand shocks. 
Second, sales are positively correlated with inventory for raw materials, but negatively 
correlated with finished goods inventory in most cases. These findings are consistent with 
the theoretical predictions from the production smoothing/buffer stock model and the (S, 
s) model, contradicting previous test results.  
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1.1 Introduction 
 
Inventory investment is of great importance in economic theory at both the macro 
and micro levels. At the macro level, it has been long regarded as a key determinant of 
business cycles.1 Macroeconomists often recognize inventory as a destabilizing factor 
which generates economic cycles that would otherwise not exist.2 At the micro level, 
however, inventories are held for various reasons to stabilize a firm’s operation. For 
instance, manufacturers store raw materials to shorten future delivery lags and to smooth 
production; wholesalers and retailers store sufficient inventory to avoid running out of 
stock. Many firms devote a significant amount of time and effort to inventory 
management.3 Why does inventory that stabilizes the microeconomic activities turn out to 
destabilize the economy at the macro level? Various models emerge to explain the 
inventory behavior, and among them, the production smoothing/buffer stock model4 
prevailed in the early literature.  
Holt. et. al. (1960) first introduce this model in which a cost minimizing firm 
chooses the labor force and output each period to minimize the sum of all future costs. 
They find that a demand shock will be absorbed by the work force, overtime hours as 
                                            
 
 
 
1
 Blinder and Maccini (1991) show that, on average, the drop in inventory investment has accounted for 
87% of the drop in GNP from 1948 to 1982 in the United States. 
2
 Figure 2 in the appendix shows the changes in GDP, sales and total inventory in United States.  
3
 See Larson, Olson and Sharma (2001), Defle and Van (2011) for discussions on the optimal inventory 
management. 
4
 The production smoothing/buffer stock model is also referred as the L-Q model in the inventory literature 
because of its functional form is linear-quadratic.  
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well as inventory fluctuations. Therefore sales revenue is more volatile than output, and it 
covaries negatively with inventory investment.5  
However, empirical findings in general are inconsistent with the theoretical 
predictions. Empirical studies show that production is more variable than sales in most 
industries. Moreover, sales and inventory investment are generally positively correlated.6 
This contradiction is considered as a fatal problem of the production smoothing/buffer 
stock model. Many economists attempted to modify the production smoothing/buffer 
stock model so that the theoretical predictions could match the data. Some modifications 
include adding cost shocks and targeted inventory levels, and altering the assumption of 
convex production cost. For example, Ramey (1988) argues that marginal cost is falling 
instead of rising so that manufacturing firms will bunch rather than smooth production; 
Fair(1989), Maccini and Rossana (1984) and Blinder (1986a) suggest that cost shocks 
induce firms to raise production and build up inventory when input costs are low; Blinder 
(1986b) argues that serial correlation in demand shocks make it inappropriate for firms to 
smooth production since the shocks seem to be permanent; Kahn (1987) shows that 
higher expected cost of running out of stock when demand increases makes firms hold 
more inventory, therefore inventory and sales are positively correlated. Other models also 
emerged to provide alternative explanations. Among them the (S, s) model is probably 
the most popular one. In this model, firms acquire new inventory to the upper limit of S if 
                                            
 
 
 
5
 Holt. et. al. (1960) discuss these results in chapter 8. Blinder and Maccini (1990) also provide similar 
predictions solving a simple version of the production smoothing/buffer stock model. 
6
 See Blinder (1981, 1986); Blanchard (1983); Haltiwanger and Maccini (1989). 
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the current inventory falls below its minimum level of s. If the inventory is anywhere 
between s and S, firms will not place a new order. The predictions from this model 
conform more closely to the stylized facts.  
On the other hand, some studies explain the inconsistency between theory and 
data by challenging the empirical test itself instead of the theory. For example, Seitz 
(1993) and Schuh (1996) find that inappropriate aggregation over firms will lead to 
biased estimated results, and Banerjee and Mizen (2006) argue that inventory and sales 
are non-stationary series. They show that the closed form solution for the dynamic model 
could get better forecast than the existing model using the UK and US data. 
From the perspective of decision makers in a firm, it is important for them to 
know how to adjust the inventory level with respect to a demand shock, in order to 
maximize profits or minimize costs. The original production smoothing/buffer stock 
model of Holt. et. al. (1960) does provide a very sophisticated discussion on the dynamic 
responses of inventory to sales fluctuations. However, when solving the model, Holt. et. 
al.  (1960) evaluate the model at only one set of parameters and show that a positive sales 
shock will reduce the inventory level. In this paper, I simulate the production 
smoothing/buffer stock model using different sets of parameters, and then find that the 
managers will adjust the inventory level differently depending on the type of the firm 
when there is a sales shock. For example, firms whose optimal inventory level is 
unrelated with its sales are more likely to use inventory as a buffer, while firms holding 
an optimal inventory level twice as large as its expected sales will build up the inventory 
and increase the inventory level when there is a positive demand shock.  
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Moreover, in the production smoothing/buffer stock model, although labor force 
as one of the decision variables is essential to the inventory problem, it is generally 
ignored in the empirical estimations in the literature. I will show the importance of 
including the labor force in the estimation in the section 1.2. 
This paper contributes to the literature in a significant way by simulating the 
production smoothing/buffer stock model with different sets of cost parameters, and then 
testing it with the labor force included in the estimation. Furthermore, many problems 
impeding earlier empirical work have been solved using the rich dataset employed in this 
paper.  First, the dataset contains two separate types of inventory, finished goods and raw 
materials. According to the literature, the production smoothing/buffer stock model is a 
better fit for the finished goods inventory held by manufacturers which involves convex 
costs, while the (S, s) model may better explain the inventory of the raw materials due to 
the fixed cost of delivery. Estimating inventory for finished goods and raw materials 
respectively will give us a better understanding of inventory behavior. In the literature, 
only a few papers have both types of inventory in their datasets, and, even if they have, 
they have not utilized the data fully to test both the production smoothing/buffer stock 
model and the (S, s) model.7 Second, the dataset is at the firm level; thus, econometric 
                                            
 
 
 
7
 Schuh (1996) mentions in the paper that the dataset contains inventory by state of fabrication, however, 
the study only concentrates on finished goods inventory; Guariglia(1999) also has separate data on finished 
goods and raw materials, but the paper focus on examining the effect of financial constraints on the 
inventory investment. 
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problems due to aggregation could be avoided.8 Third, although there are quite a few 
studies using firm level data, for example, Schuh (1996) uses firm level data is the U.S. 
manufacturing industry, and Iturriaga (2000) employs a data set from 172 Spanish firms, 
there is no study analyzing the problem in Chinese firms, despite China’s being among 
the world’s leading manufacturer.9 A summary of the datasets that have been used to 
examine inventory behavior is provided in the Appendix Table 2. 
Some interesting results are found in this paper. Simulation in Section 1.2 shows 
that the sales shock could be positively correlated with the inventory investment in some 
circumstances. Using the Chinese State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) dataset, it is shown that 
the variance of the annual gross output is smaller than that of the sales revenues at the 
aggregate level. In particular, small firms in heavy industry show strong evidence of 
using inventory to smooth production and buffer demand shocks. In addition, sales are 
positively correlated with investment in raw materials in all models, but negatively 
correlated with finished goods investment in most of the models. These findings are 
consistent with the predictions from the production smoothing/buffer stock model and the 
(S, s) model. Furthermore, the work force is found to be positively correlated with sales 
as well as inventory. Therefore, when estimating the effect of sales on inventory, omitting 
                                            
 
 
 
8
 Seitz (1993) and Schuh (1996) find that inappropriate aggregation over firms will lead to biased estimated 
results. 
9
 Iturriaga (2000) has a good summary on the countries that were studied in the inventory problem. 
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the work force will give us a positive bias in the coefficient on the sales.10 This can 
possibly explain why most existing empirical papers obtained a positive relationship 
between sales and inventory which contradicts the predictions of the production 
smoothing/buffer stock model. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the 
original versions of the production smoothing/buffer stock model, followed by the 
estimation models. Section 1.3 describes the dataset with summary statistics. Section 1.4 
estimates the production smoothing/buffer stock model and section 1.5 tests the (S, s) 
model. Section 1.6 concludes this paper. 
1.2 The model 
 
Holt. et. al. (1960) originally introduced the production smoothing/buffer stock 
model in their work of Planning Production, Inventories, and Work Force. The analysis 
of inventory behavior for finished goods is based on this model, upon which the 
empirical model is built.11 
The set up of this model is from the point of view of a production manager. 
Assuming the sales volume and the market price are beyond his control, the problem for 
him is not to maximize the profits, but to minimize the sum of all expected future costs 
                                            
 
 
 
10
 The work force is positively correlated with both the sales and the inventory, thus if not controlling for 
the work force, one unit increase in sales will increase the work force, and the increase in the work force 
will increase the inventory as well, which will bias up the effect of the sales on the inventory. 
11
 Many papers simplified the production smoothing/buffer stock model and get similar predictions, but the 
empirical results are not consistent with the theory. See Blinder and Maccini (1990) for a literature review. 
Analyzing the original production smoothing/buffer stock model may allow us a better estimation method.  
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over a horizon. In every period, the manager has some expectations on the future orders, 
and then he decides the number of workers he needs and how many to produce. He could 
hire or fire workers at some costs, and once the worker is employed, regular payroll will 
be paid. Workers will product the output, and the products are then stocked as inventory. 
When an order is received by the manager, he needs to choose between fluctuation in the 
inventory and the production. On one hand, a big fluctuation in the inventory level means 
that additional storage costs will be involved when inventory is high, and running out of 
stock may occur if inventory is low. On the other hand, the manager could meet the 
demand through flexible production. When demand is high, he could hire more workers 
or asked them to work overtime; and when the demand is low, layoffs or idle time may be 
involved.  Thus, four main costs are involved in planning production and employment, 
which are regular payroll, hiring and firing costs, overtime costs, and inventory holding 
and back order costs.12 The managers will consider and compare all these costs, and the 
firm’s objective is then to minimize the sum of these costs over a horizon. The production 
smoothing/buffer stock model is:13 
,,	
,,,	
                    !"  #  $%  &        2  1 
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 For more discussions on the costs involved in planning production and employment, see chapter 2 in 
Holt. et. al. (1960). 
13
 Holt. el. al.(1960) state that it is not necessary to place non-negativity restraints on the variables.  A 
negative value, such as negative production, will be undesirable because they are expensive, and these 
actions will be automatically avoided in cost minimization. Also an interior cost minimum exists if 
C2,C3,C4 and C7 are positive and 0 +  + 4. 
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Subject to:  %  "  "                                                         2  2 
In this model, I am minimizing the total cost which is the sum of all the future 
costs, where CT is the total cost, C1-C12 are the parameters, Wt is the work force, Yt is the 
aggregate production, It is the inventory and St is the ordered shipments. Notations are 
consistent with those in Holt. el. al. (1960) so that comparisons between the solutions 
could be better discussed.  
Among various costs, four main costs are included in the cost function and related 
to the decision in the production and the labor force as discussed earlier.    is 
the regular payroll cost which is a linear function, where is the average wage rate and is some fixed cost component;      is the cost of hiring and layoffs 
which increases with both more or less workers, makes the costs asymmetrical so that 
it is more general;           is the overtime costs, 
where  is the average production rate, and the more actual production is, the more 
overtime cost will be for a given size of the work force;14 and !"  #  $% is the 
inventory holding and back order costs, where #  $% is the optimal inventory, and the 
                                            
 
 
 
14
 The overtime cost is better measured as a quadratic function: if there are only a few more products 
needed, then only several workers will be asked to work overtime and the cost is low; but if lots of products 
are required, then more workers are involved and the overtime costs will increase faster. Although the 
approximation to the cost is poor when the production is low, the quadratic function is fit in the relevant 
range as Holt. el. al. (1960) stated. The other three terms , , and  are for better 
approximation. 
14 
 
more deviation from the optimal inventory level, the more inventory holding cost will be 
involved.15  
In every period, the inventory in the last period will be carried over to the next 
period, and the net of the production and the sales will be stored as inventory, so the 
constraint should be held, which is that the inventory in this period " is the inventory in 
the last period " plus the production  and the current sale % . 
 The first-order conditions for this minimization problem can be obtained by 
differentiating CT with respect to each decision variables, which are {Y1,…,YT} and 
{W1,…,WT}. Solving a system of the first-order conditions yields Wt and Yt. Using 
equation2  2, I obtain the decision rules for the inventory: 
"  -  -1"   - %..  -             2  316 
Where C is a vector of the parameters in CT. 
Equation 2  3 indicates that inventory in period t is a function of the labor 
force in previous periods, the past inventory, and all future expected sales. Holt. et. al. 
(1960) evaluate inventory behavior given certain values of the cost parameters, and 
obtained negative sign on St. They also show that the change in sales will be absorbed by 
the inventory, work force and overtime hours, so that all three served as buffers and 
smooth out the production. Therefore, variance in production will be less than that in 
                                            
 
 
 
15
 More discussions on the cost terms could be found in chapter 4 in Holt. el. al. (1960). 
16
 See the derivation in the appendix. Equation (2-3) is the same with the equation (21) in the appendix. 
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sales; and inventory is negatively correlated with sales.17 This conclusion has been 
widely used in the inventory literature, and referred as the production smoothing/buffer 
stock model. However, this result is derived using only one set of parameters, which is 
not conclusive. It is still an open area for us to determine the effects of sales on inventory 
robustly.  
While it is difficult to obtain an analytical solution regarding the signs on sales, 
simulation can be used to further the analysis. Taking the values of the parameters 
presented in Holt. et. al. (1960), I vary one parameter, holding all others the same, and 
obtain the corresponding coefficients of sales on inventory, that is -  in equation2 3. In particular, the cost of hiring and layoffs and inventory holding costs are of high 
interests, which are related to C2 and C7. In order to examine the importance of the labor 
force in the regression model, I also obtain the coefficient of the sales on the labor force, 
which is 1 in equation (18) in the appendix.  
Figure 3 in the appendix shows the corresponding coefficients when varying C2, 
the hiring and layoff costs, between 0.1 and 1. The upper figure is the coefficients of 
sales on inventory. Controlling for the initial labor force, when the current sales increase, 
inventory decreases. But when the expected sales in the next period increase, inventory 
will be built up; and the effects of the third period sales on current inventory are 
negligible.18 The lower figure of the panel presents the coefficients of sales on the labor 
                                            
 
 
 
17
 The dynamic response of inventory, labor force and production to sales fluctuations is discussed in 
Chapter 8 in Holt. el. al. (1960). 
18
 The effects of the sales in fourth period or later on inventory are also negligible. 
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force, and it shows that when current sales go up, the labor force will go up, and thus 
more goods are produced, and invenotry will be built up. From this panel, I also find that 
as C2 increase, that is with higher layoff costs, more inventory will be used and 
workforce adjustment is empolyed to accommodate the sales. 
Figure 4 examines the corresponding coefficients when varying C7, the inventory 
holding costs, between 0.1 and 1. I find that inventory also decrease as current sales 
increase whatever the inventory holding cost is, but when there is a high inventory 
holding cost, firm will prefer to hire more workers for production and inventory will not 
deviate from the optimal level too much.  
However, when I vary the vaules of some cost parameter, different conclusions 
are obtained. Figure 5 presents how sales shock affects inventory and workers when 
varying the multiplier for the optimal inventory level from 0 to 1. When the optimal 
inventory level is more proportional to the sales, firms will tend to build up more 
inventory to reduce the inventory holding cost, and more workers are hired to produce the 
required amount. Thus, as the multiplier for the optimal inventory level increases, 
inventory may swtich from decresing to increasing as the current sales increases. This is a 
new finding from solving the production smoothing/buffer stock model, and it tells that 
inventory could be positively correlated with the current sales.  
Figures 6 and 7 are produced when changing the value of C9, the mulitiplier for 
the optimal inventory level, from 0 to 1. From figure 6 I find that inventory increase as 
current sales increase at every value of C2, the hiring and layoff costs. This contradicts 
the original prediction of the production smoothing/buffer stock model. The optimal 
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inventory level was unrelated with the sales in the figures 3 and 4, but now is the same 
size as the sales. Thus, when the sales increases, the inventory will also need to be built 
up in order to reduce the inventory holding costs. Figure 7 shows that the inventory will 
be build up at a constant rate whatever the inventory holding costs C7 is. This may be due 
to the value of the mulitiplier for the optimal inventory level C9 I set up. The cost of 
deviating optimal inventory level is high enough to ensure the stock of the inventory will 
follow a pattern. 
Based on the discussions above, the effect of a sales shock on inventory 
investment could be negative or positive depending on the assignment of the cost 
parameters. In addition, the labor force should be included in the estimation. Omitting the 
labor force variable will cause serious bias in the results because it is correlated with 
sales; thus bias the coefficient on the sales upward. I focus on the sales in current and 
next period since later periods have trivial effects on inventory. The empirical model is 
thus: 
"  23  2"  2  2%  2%4  5                      2  4 
1.3 The Data 
1.3.1 Summary Statistics 
 
The dataset employed in this paper comes from a large-scale survey of Chinese 
State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) from 769 manufacturing firms between 1980 and 1989. 
Enterprises were sampled from four provinces in China: Shanxi from the north, Jilin in 
the northeast, Jiangsu in the coastal region, and Sichuan in the southwest. The sample 
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covers several industries, such as Mining & Utilities, Light Manufacturing, Chemical, 
Heavy Manufacturing, and others, which represents China’s overall industrial structure.  
A total of 160 firms were dropped due to incomplete data, of which, the operating 
year of 43 firms started after 1980 and thus didn’t have the complete time span for the 
analysis. Further, firms with a zero or missing values for the key variables such as 
production, total inventory, sales revenue of products and total labor force, were dropped 
as well. 
A rich set of variables are available to examine inventory behavior by stage of 
fabrication: raw materials and finished goods. The summary statistics of relevant 
variables for analysis are shown in Appendix Table 3. 
According to Blinder and Maccini (1991), investment in manufacturers’ finished 
goods inventory is the smallest components of total inventory investment, and raw 
materials held by manufacturers are the most volatile components of total inventory 
investment. In this dataset, the mean and variance as well as coefficient of variation (CV) 
for investment in raw materials are 564,500 RMB, 1,653,280 RMB and 2.93 respectively, 
compared with that for the finished goods, 137,900 RMB, 390,750 RMB and 2.83, which 
is consistent with the findings in Blinder and Maccini. 
The standard deviation and CV of the annual gross output are smaller than that of 
the sales revenues of products. This result is contrary to most empirical literature, but 
more consistent with the prediction of production smoothing/buffer stock model, in 
which firms use inventory to smooth out production. However, when broken down by 
industries, sizes and locations, mixed results are presented in table 4. In particular, small 
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firms in heavy industry show strong evidence of using inventory to smooth out 
production and buffer demand shocks. One explanation for this is that small firms have 
lower production capacity and it takes longer time to produce one unit of product in 
heavy industry. Inventory is expected to be used especially when demand is high. 
1.3.2 The Applicability of the Data 
 
Although China was a planned economy after 1949, a series of reforms of SOEs 
were undertaken beginning in 1978 to motivate managers and workers to be more 
productive.19 For example, one of the policies is to allow firms to retain a portion of their 
profits if they fulfill the targets, or pay penalty when a loss occurs. The reforms stimulate 
the managers of SOEs to reduce costs in pursuing higher profits.20 The government also 
implemented the State-owned Enterprise Cost Management Regulations on March 5th of 
1984, which provided detailed guidance to induce SOEs to control the cost. It is 
reasonable to assume that managers of SOEs at this time had strong incentives to 
minimize some costs, such as the inventory holding cost, machine setup cost, shortage 
cost, overtime cost, and hiring and firing costs which are the components in the 
production smoothing/buffer stock model.  Furthermore, even if firms did not minimize 
the regular payroll because managers in SOEs were incentive to pay higher wages or 
bonuses than would be costing minimizing, this would not be important of our study. All 
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 See discussions about SOE reforms in Groves et al.(1994), Lee(1999), Choe and Yin (2000), Ying(2001), 
Dong and Putterman (2002). 
20
 Groves et al.(1994) show that the profit retention rates rises from a mean of 24% in 1980 to 63% in 1989. 
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that is required for our analysis is cost minimizing behavior regarding production and 
employment decision conditional on wages. 
The SOE managers were also given greater flexibility to decide output and output 
price. As for the labor force, temporary workers were also employed for production 
flexibility, and managers are allowed to send the redundant workers home and pay them a 
very low wage.21 More importantly, the cost of hiring and firing are involved in the 
model, so even if the firm did not have great flexibility in hiring and layoffs, the model 
itself has the ability to respond this constraint. 
Based on the discussions above, the production smoothing/buffer stock model 
could be tested using this dataset. 
1.4 Estimation Results 
 
According to the equation 2  4 from the production smoothing/buffer stock 
model, inventory and the labor force in the last period, and current period and next period 
sales are used as the explanatory variables. The effects of the sales after the next period 
are negligible from the simulation results, so they are not included in the estimation. 
Thus, the following model is used to examine inventory behavior on the finished 
goods. 
1)-(4                                                  ln                        
lnlnlnln
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 See Groves et al.(1994) and Yin (2001). 
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Two econometric problems may arise from estimating equation4  1. First, the 
presence of the lagged dependent variable may give rise to autocorrelation; second, the 
time-invariant firm characteristics, such as firm size and location, may be correlated with 
the explanatory variables. To cope with the problems, Arrellano-Bond estimator is used 
for estimation.  
The coefficient on sales is of the highest interest. In particular, I want to see what 
the sales shock effects will be after controlling for the labor force. The main results are 
summarized in the table below, which compares the results between models with 
different control variables. Equation 4  1 will also be estimated for all firms as well as 
by different firm sizes and industries and corresponding results could be found in tables 5 
and 6 in the appendix. 
Table 1 Test for the Effect of a Sales Shock on Inventory 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
ln(sales) 0.047 
(0.0627) 
-0.251*** 
(0.0733) 
-0.253*** 
(0.0721) 
Labor force included N N Y 
FE N Y Y 
Fit 0.68 0.25 0.55 
N 1962 1962 1962 
Note: The model fit is calculated using the square of the correlation between the observed and the 
predicted value.  
The first specification is the basic model, which only uses the sales as the 
explanatory variable. The production smoothing/buffer stock model gets a positive effect 
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of the sales shock on inventory. Model 2 includes the time fixed effects, and the sales 
shock effect becomes negative. Some time trends, such as the ever-changing macro 
economy environment, the political or merchandise policies, will play an important role 
in the industry, which affect the manufacturers’ performances in various circumstances. 
Thus, ignoring the time fixed effects in the model may cause biased results. Finally, when 
adding the labor force in the model, a negative effect of the sales shock on the finished 
goods is obtained for the production smoothing/buffer stock model as well. The 
coefficient for the model without the labor force is -0.251, which is greater than that for 
the one with the labor force, -0.253, which confirms that omitting the labor force in the 
production smoothing/buffer stock model will bias up the effect of the sales shock on the 
inventory.22 
Tables 5 and 6 show us the estimation results from equation 4  1 by different 
firm sizes and industries. The coefficients on sales are negative and significant in most of 
these models, and the one exception is for the “other industries” category. This finding is 
consistent with the predictions from the production smoothing/buffer stock model; that is, 
sales are negatively correlated with investment in finished goods in most cases. The 
coefficient for the other industry is positive but insignificant. That may be due to the 
mixed properties of the firms. The coefficients on the sales in the next period are all 
insignificant which confirms that the effects of future sales on inventory investment are 
negligible. The mining and heavy industries have the largest impact of sales shock on 
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 See footnote 10 for more details. 
 inventory. As we know, the products in the mining and heavy sector are more 
complicated so that it takes more time to produce when a new order is placed, that is, the 
average production rate is relatively low. From the simulation changing the parameter of 
the average production rate C
more the inventory will be consumed when there is a positive sales shock, which is 
consistent with the empirical results for the mining and heavy industries.
 
Figure 1 Coefficients of Sales 
Note: This graph shows the coeffcients 
smoothing/buffer stock model from 
average production rate C4. The 
C4.  
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The lagged inventory investment is significantly correlated with inventory 
investment in all models except testing for the small firms, and thus Arrellano-Bond 
estimator is reasonable for the estimation.  
The effect of the labor force on inventory is also of our interest. Holt. et. al. 
(1960) point out that, when the labor force in the last period increases, total production 
will rise and inventory will be piled up. Labor can also be used to buffer demand shocks, 
and hence β2 in the equation 4  1 are expected to be positive. The results show the 
coefficients on the lag of the labor are almost all significantly positive as expected.   
Table 7 examines that the effect of sales shock on the labor. Based on the 
equation (18) from the appendix, the following specification is employed using 
Arrellano-Bond estimation. 
2)-(4                                                                                                     
lnlnlnlnln 1,4,31,21,10
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The labor force and the sales are significantly positively correlated. If not 
controlling for the work force, one unit increase in sales will increase the work force, and 
the increase in the work force will increase the inventory as well, which will bias up the 
effect of the sales on the inventory. Therefore, leaving the labor force in the error term 
will positively bias the effect of the demand shock on inventory.  
Furthermore, from the simulation results in section 1.2, when layoff costs C2 
increases, more inventory is used and less workers are adjusted to accommodate a 
positive sales shock. Equation 4  3 is used to test for this prediction. 
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In the data set, there is one categorical variable that represents how much 
flexibility the manager has to fire a worker. There are total five levels: no flexibility, a 
little bit, some, quite a bit and flexible. Only 1.18% of the firms have complete flexibility 
to fire a worker, and 8.42% of them have quite a bit flexibility, then followed by 26.6%, 
41.25% and 22.56% (refer to table 8). I used this variable as a proxy to the layoff costs. 
The more flexibility the manager has to fire a worker, the less layoff cost it will be in this 
firm.  
Since there are five discrete levels for the layoff costs, dummies are generated for 
each level, and then interact with the sales respectively. If the estimation results are 
consistent with the prediction, the coefficients on the interaction terms should be smaller 
for the higher layoff cost. The results in table 9 conforms this hypothesis. All interactions 
are significant and decreasing in trend as the layoff cost increases.  
1.5 Estimating the (S, s) model 
 
There are two measures of inventory in general, manufacturing inventory and 
trade inventory. Trade inventory composes an important part of total inventory, which is 
even more than manufacturing inventory.23 The production smoothing/buffer stock model 
discussed above assumes a firm minimizes the expected costs when planning production 
and this is a better fit for manufacturing inventory, especially the finished goods they 
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 Refer to figure 8 in the appendix. 
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produce. However, I can’t use the same model to examine trade inventory since retailers 
and wholesalers are not involved in production. Instead, the (S, s) model is one of the 
most popular models to explain trade inventory behavior.  
Under the (S, s) model, a representative firm selects its inventory level to 
minimize the expected value of the sum of discounted costs in all future periods.24 Unlike 
the production smoothing/buffer stock model, there are three types of costs involved, the 
purchasing cost, inventory holding cost and shortage costs. The model predicts that firms 
order a shipment if the initial inventory falls below a critical value of S, but won’t buy 
more as long as the inventory stays above the critical value of s. Scarf (1959) finds that as 
long as the inventory holding and shortage costs are convex and ordering cost is some 
fixed costs plus the value of purchased goods, the results will always hold without any 
additional conditions. 
Under the (S, s) policy, it is intuitive to see that firms will order a shipment and 
the inventory level will be restored if inventory falls below s due to a demand shock. As a 
result, there is a positive relationship between inventory and demand shock. In addition, 
output (in terms of purchasing) will be more volatile than sales. Most empirical papers 
found positive results for the (S, s) model.  
The decision to hold raw materials by manufacturers is quite similar to retailers 
and wholesalers hold finished goods inventory since they all involve a fixed delivery 
cost. Estimating inventory for finished goods and raw materials respectively will give us 
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 Arrow, Harris and Marschak (1951) set up the problem of minimizing discounted costs using the (S, s) 
policy but didn’t solve it. Scarf (1959) proves that the optimal inventory policy is indeed the (S, s) form. 
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a better understanding of inventory behavior. Following the literature, I include the sales 
and one lag of the inventory in the estimation.25  The model specification is: 
1)-(5                 lnln    
,21,10 itttitiit vsalesinventoryinventory εβββ ++++= −  
 
The Arrellano-Bond estimator is used for estimation as well, and the coefficient 
on sales is of the highest interest. The production smoothing/buffer stock model predicts 
it to be negative in most cases, but the (S, s) model show it is positive. Tables 10 and 11 
provide us the estimation results by different firm sizes and industries. The coefficient on 
sales are all significantly positive in all models which is consistent with the predictions 
from the (S, s) model. The explanation to the opposite signs is intuitive. When there is a 
positive demand shock, manufacturers will place more orders of raw materials and 
accelerate production, so investment in raw materials will increase. However, it takes 
time to produce. If firms couldn’t make enough products to meet the demand, inventory 
will be used as a buffer; hence investment in finished goods will decline. 
In order to have a better sense on how well the models fit the data, I examine the 
model fit and the residue plot for each regression. The model fit is calculated using the 
square of the correlation between the observed and the predicted value, and reported in 
the table. The model fits are fairly strong, most of which are higher than 0.5, which 
indicates that the predicted value has a high correlation with the observed value, and the 
model fits the data well. I also do residue plot for all regressions and present two 
                                            
 
 
 
25See Blinder and Maccini (1990) for a literature review. It will be also interesting to examine the effects of 
the delivery and purchasing cost on the inventory investment. However, since the cost function is 
discontinuous, the analytical solution is difficult to derive. I may resort to simulation for future work. 
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representative plots in the figure 9 in the appendix, which are from testing the production 
smoothing/buffer stock model and the (S, s) model using the full data. Residues are 
distributed randomly around zero against the predicted values for most regressions, and 
all these analyses support that both models are good fits for the data. 
1.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
Two theories that explain the behavior of inventory investment are the production 
smoothing/buffer stock model and the (S, s) model. The production smoothing/buffer 
stock model introduced by Holt. et. al. (1960) is a better fit for manufacturing inventory, 
especially the finished goods. It predicts that sales revenue is more volatile than output, 
and it covaries negatively with inventory investment. However, empirical findings 
obtained opposite results: the production is more variable than sales in most industries, 
and sales and inventory investment are generally positively correlated. Hence, economists 
began to doubt the applicability of the production smoothing/buffer stock model. By 
analyzing the original production smoothing/buffer stock model, ambiguous relation 
between a sales shock and inventory investment are obtained. In addition, the labor force 
is found to be a crucial component of the model and excluding it from the estimation will 
lead to biased results. To date, this is the first paper that considers the impact of the labor 
force in the empirical test of inventory behavior. 
Using a rich Chinese firm-level dataset covering 769 manufacturing firms from 
1980 to 1989, finished goods inventory is used to test the production smoothing/buffer 
stock model which involves the rising marginal cost when planning production, while 
inventory of the raw materials is applied to test the (S ,s) model assuming a fixed delivery 
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cost.  I find that the variance of the annual gross output is smaller than that of the sales 
revenues of products. In particular, small firms in heavy industry show strong evidence to 
use inventory to smooth production and buffer demand shocks.  Moreover, sales are 
positively correlated with investment in raw materials, but negatively correlated with 
finished goods inventory in most cases. This is consistent with the predictions from both 
the production smoothing/buffer stock model and the (S, s) model. Furthermore, the labor 
force is found to be positively related with demand as well as the inventory, which 
indicates that excluding the labor force in the estimation will cause biased results. This 
explains why previous studies found contradicting results to the theoretical predictions. 
While it is crucial to include the labor force in the estimation, some other 
variables could also be important in the analysis. For example, some literature studies the 
effect of cost shocks and financial constraints on inventory investment. If these variables 
are also correlated with both the inventory and one or more regressors, then omitted 
variable bias will occur. I would like to explore this further in the future, and include 
more variables in the estimation to see if any other factor is crucial to be included when 
analyzing the effect of sales shock on inventory. 
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Appendix 
Derivation of the decision rule for inventory 
 
The production smoothing/buffer stock model is 
min,,	
,,,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Subject to:  %  "  "                                                            (2) 
where   CT is the total cost; 
             Wt is the work force; 
             Yt is the aggregate production; 
             It is the inventory; 
             St is the ordered shipments; 
             C1Wt+C13 is the regular payroll cost; 
             C2(Wt – Wt-1 – C11)2 is the cost of hiring and layoffs; 
             C3(Yt – C4Wt )2+ C5Yt- C6Wt+ C12 Yt Wt is the overtime costs; 
             C7(It – (C8+ C9St ))2 is the inventory, back order and machine setup costs. 
Take partial derivatives of E(CT) with respect to {W1,…,WT} to obtain: 
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2  2  2  2    0 4  
Solving Equations (3) & (4) for Yt yields: 
:      4  2:  2:2:42    where D  1,2, … , E  1 5 
      2  2  22     6  
Then taking partial derivatives of E(CT) with respect to {Y1,…,YT}to find: 
99:  2:  :    :  2! ".  #  $%.

.:
 2:  2:  2!  "..:  2!$  %.

.: 2E  D  1!#    0 where D  1,2, … E  7  
From equation (7) I obtain: 
2!  "..:  2:  2:  2!$  %.

.:  2E  D  1!#    0 where D  1,2, … E  8  
When r=1, equation (8) turns to be: 
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2!"  "   "  2  2  2!$  %..  2E!#     9 
When r=2, equation (8) turns to be: 
 
2!"   "
 2  2  2!$  %..  2E  1!#     10 
Subtract equation (10) from equation (9) yields : 
2!"  2    2    2!$%  2!#  11  
Similarly I obtain the following equation: 
2!":  2:4  :  2:4  :  2!$%:  2!#  where r 1,2, … T  1  12   
When r=T, equation (8) turns to be: 
2!"  2  2  2!$%  2!#    13     
From equation (12) I obtain 
2!":  ": 2:4  2:  :  2:4  2:  : 2!$%:  %:  where r  2, … T  1  14 
Combining equation (2), (11), (12), (13) & (14) yields: 
2!  %  2    2    2!$%  2!# 2!"3   15 
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2!:  %:  2:4  2:  :  2:4  2:  : 2!$%:  %:  where r  2, … T  1  16 2!  %  22    22    2!$% %     17     
Substitute equation (5) & (6) into equations (15)-(17) to eliminate Yt, obtaining a system 
of equations: 
$  3  !  1  $%    !3  #  3  "3 !:  :  :  :4  !:4
 $%:  1  $%  3  J-KDK r  2, … T  2    
!      3  $%  1  $%  3 
!      $%  1  $%  3   2!  3! 
where C10=C1-C6 
C14≡2C3C4-C12 
C15≡2C2/C14 
C16≡2C3C42/C14 
C17≡C3C15/C7 
C18≡C3C16/C7-C14/2C7 
C19≡C16+C18+2C15+3C17 
C20≡C15+3C17+C18 
C21≡C15+4C17+C18 
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C22≡C16+2C18+2C15+6C17 
C23≡C16+2C15 
C24≡ C16+2C18+C15+3C17 
This system has T unknown variables and T equations, and I write it in a matrix form 
LM
MM
MM
MM
MN $ 3 ! 0     0   ! 0   !    ! 0   0 !    ! 0 O  P   P !   30 !   QR
RR
RR
RR
RS
LM
MMM
MMM
MN P
 QR
RRR
RRR
RS
 
=
LM
MM
MM
MM
MM
MN1  $%    !3  #  CTCU  "3$%  1  $%  !3  CTCU$%  1  $%  CTCU$%  1  $%  CTCUP
$%  1  $%  CTCU$%  1  $%  CTCU  CVCW  CXCTCWCU QR
RR
RR
RR
RR
RS
 
Solving this system of equations I obtain Wt. Thus, conditional on the initial values of 
workers Wt-1 and inventories It-1, I find the following decision rule: 
  1  1"   1%..  1       18 
4  1   1"   1!%..  1#       19 
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Where C is a vector of the cost parameters in CT, and fi(C) is a function that only 
depends on C. 
From equation (12), (18) and (19), we could see that : YZ :4 are correlated 
with ": as well as %:. Thus, if I examine the effect of sales on inventory without 
considering the effect of : YZ :4, in other words, I regress inventory on sales, 
leaving the labor force in the error term, there will be a bias.  
One way to fix this problem is to find instruments for : YZ :4. From 
equation (18) and (19), we could see that  is correlated with : YZ :4, and also 
it is predetermined. So it is good to use  as an instrument for both : YZ :4. 
Substitute equation (18) & (19) into equation (5), I obtain 
  -   -"   -%..  -    20 
Using equation (2), I could get another decision rule for the inventory: 
"  -  -1"   - %..  -    21 
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Figure 2 Changes in GDP, Inventories and Sales in Billions of Current Dollars 
Note:  All data are seasonally adjusted and in billions of current dollars. GDP is obtained from 
BEA. Inventory data includes manufacturer and trade inventory, and is extracted from U.S. 
Census Bureau. 
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Figure 8 Manufacturing and Trade Inventory 
Note:  All data are seasonally adjusted and in millions of current dollars. Obtained from U.S. 
Census Bureau. 
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Figure 9 Residue Plots for Estimating the Production Smoothing/Buffer Stock 
Model and the (S, s) Model 
Note: The upper figure is the residues against the predicted values from estimating equation (4-1). 
The lower figure is the residues against the predicted values from estimating equation (5-1). 
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Table 2 Survey of the Datasets Used to Examine Inventory Behavior 
Paper Data Variables 
Miron and Zelds 
(1988) 
Industrial level data for US 
firms from May 1967 to 
December 1982 
Inventory, sales, interest rate, 
tax rate, wages, price of raw 
materials and energy, capital 
stock, monthly precipitation 
and temperature 
Cuthbertson and 
Gasparro (1993) 
Aggregated data from 1968:1 to 
1989:4 in UK 
Inventory and output, capital 
gearing 
Hay and Louri 
(1994) 
Annually data for UK quoted 
companies in 13 different 
industrial sector in the period 
1960-85  
Balance sheet and profit and 
loss account 
Schuh (1996) 
 
Firm-level data in U.S. 
manufacturing industry 
from1985 to 1993. 
Sales and inventories by stage-
of-fabrication: finished goods, 
work-in process and raw 
materials 
Allen (1997) 
Firm-level data for US firms 
from 1981:1 to 1991:1 
 
Inventory and sales 
Carpenter, Fazzari 
and Petersen (1998) 
 
Firm-level data for US firms 
from 1981:3 to 1992:4 
 
Inventory, Sales, cash stock, 
cash flow and coverage ratio  
McCarthy and 
Zakrajsek (1998) 
Firm-level data for 
manufactures, retails and whole 
sales trade firms from 1981:4 to 
1997:4 
Inventory and sales 
Guariglia (1999) 
 
Annually data for 994 UK 
manufacturing firms from 1968 
to 1991 
Total, work-in-process and raw 
materials inventories, sales and 
coverage ratio 
Fafchamps, 
Gunning and 
Oostendorp (2000) 
Firm-level data for Zimbabwean 
manufacturing firms from 1993 
to 1995 
Inventories for raw materials, 
work-in-process and finished 
goods, sales, contractual risks, 
variables related liquidity 
constraints 
Iturriaga (2000) 
 
Firm-level data of  172 Spanish 
firms from July 1990 to 
December 1995  
   
Total inventories, sales, 
finished goods variation and 
material variation 
Banerjee and Mizen 
(2006) 
Aggregated data for US and UK 
from 1982:1 to 2001:2 Inventory and sales 
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Table 2. Continued. 
Paper Data Variables 
Tsoukalas (2006) 
Firm-level data for US 
manufacturers from 1975:1 to 
1995:4. 
Inventory and cash flow 
Herrera, 
Murtazashvili nd 
Pesavento (2008) 
Firm-level data for US firms 
from January 1659 to March 
2000 
Inventory by stages of 
production and sales 
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Table 3 Summary Statistics on Selected Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
CV 
( Coefficient of Variation) 
Annual gross output 3187.10 10314.17 3.24 
Sales revenue of products 3152.54 11040.72 3.50 
Total inventory  1024.1 2263.28 2.21 
Raw materials  564.50 1653.28 2.93 
Finished goods  137.90 390.75 2.83 
Total number of workers 1902.95 5451.11 2.86 
Note: All variables are in ten thousands of RMB except the total numbers of workers. 
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Table 4 Standard Deviation of Output and Sales by Firm Sizes, Locations and 
Industries 
 
Output 
(Ten thousands of 
RMB) 
Sales 
(Ten thousands of 
RMB) 
Firm size 
Large firm 
 
19891.32 
 
21249.08 
Medium firm 3397.01 3311.91 
Small firm 1214.09 3497.67 
 
Location 
Ji Lin(northeast) 
 
 
15811.28 
 
 
17380.3 
Jiang Su(coastal region) 5763.54 5339.38 
Shan Xi(north) 9342.92 9806.05 
Si Chuan(southwest) 4243.33 3977.91 
 
Industry 
Chemical industry 
 
 
18855.9 
 
 
19380.82 
Heavy industry 4881.414 7258.23 
Light industry 4699.36 5642.05 
Mining industry 18869.94 18322.43 
Other 5994.50 5677.77 
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Table 5 Test for the Production Smoothing/Buffer Stock model by Different Firm 
Sizes 
Variable All firms Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
ln(inventory).L1 
 
0.406*** 
(0.0544) 
 
0.394*** 
(0.1101) 
 
0.446*** 
(0.0603) 
 
0.388*** 
(0.0889) 
ln(sales) 
 
-0.253*** 
(0.0721) 
 
-0.331** 
(0.1143) 
 
-0.103 
(0.1109) 
 
-0.444*** 
(0.1177) 
ln(sales_n+1) 
 
-0.095 
(0.0653) 
 
-0.146 
(0.1134) 
 
-0.116 
(0.1170) 
 
0.015 
(0.1040) 
ln(labors).L1 
 
0.440* 
(0.2665) 
 
1.007** 
(0.5035) 
 
0.291 
(0.3380) 
 
0.730*** 
(0.4341) 
Fit 0.55 0.45 0.54 0.75 
N 1962 496 936 530 
Note: This estimation is based on the equation (4-1). All standard errors are robust and reported 
in parentheses. The model fit is calculated using the square of the correlation between the 
observed and the predicted value. *Significant at 10%.  **Significant at 5%.  ***Significant at 
1%. 
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Table 6 Test for the Production Smoothing/Buffer Stock Model by Different 
Industries 
Variable Mining Light Chemical Heavy Other 
ln(inventory).
L1 
 
0.144 
(0.1950) 
 
0.387*** 
(0.0736) 
 
0.198** 
(0.0903) 
 
0.337*** 
(0.0832) 
 
0.410*** 
(0.1097) 
ln(sales) 
 
-0.371 
(0.3814) 
 
-0.309 
(0.2479) 
 
-0.187* 
(0.1051) 
 
-0.451*** 
(0.1022) 
 
0.058 
(0.0938) 
ln(sales_n+1) 
 
-0.012 
(0.3266) 
 
-0.110 
(0.1652) 
 
-0.266*** 
(0.1020) 
 
-0.032 
(0.0907) 
 
0.051 
(0.1724) 
ln(labors).L1 
 
2.332*** 
(0.9216) 
 
1.044** 
(0.4261) 
 
1.4255*** 
(0.5120) 
 
-0.360 
(0.3815) 
 
0.119 
(0.3519) 
Fit 0.59 0.51 0.67 0.02 0.65 
N 84 438 374 824 242 
Note: This estimation is based on the equation (4-1). All standard errors are robust and reported 
in parentheses. The model fit is calculated using the square of the correlation between the 
observed and the predicted value. *Significant at 10%.  **Significant at 5%.  ***Significant at 
1%. 
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Table 7 Test for the Effect of a Sale Shock on the Labor Force  
Variable All firms Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
ln(labor).L1 
 
0.157 
(0.0989) 
 
0.227*** 
(0.0828) 
 
0.144 
(0.1533) 
 
0.330*** 
(0.1017) 
ln(inventory).L1 
 
-0.002 
(0.0029) 
 
-0.004 
(0.0049) 
 
-0.0003 
(0.0051) 
 
0.004 
(0.0062) 
ln(sales) 
 
0.0559*** 
(0.0101) 
 
0.070*** 
(0.0214) 
 
0.0673*** 
(0.0165) 
 
0.035** 
(0.0149) 
ln(sales_n+1) 
 
0.0255*** 
(0.0077) 
 
0.039*** 
(0.0123) 
 
0.0042 
(0.0156) 
 
0.038** 
(0.0154) 
Fit 0.89 0.88 0.79 0.96 
N 1982 504 944 534 
Note: This estimation is based on the equation (4-2). All standard errors are robust and reported 
in parentheses. The model fit is calculated using the square of the correlation between the 
observed and the predicted value. *Significant at 10%.  **Significant at 5%.  ***Significant at 
1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 Summary Statistics for the Instrument to the Layoff Cost 
The flexibility to fire a worker N freq 
No 1340 22.56 
A little bit 2450 41.25 
Some 1580 26.60 
Quite a bit 500 8.42 
flexible 70 1.18 
Note: See more discussion for the instrument used for the layoff cost in the text. 
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Table 9 Test for the Effect of Layoff Costs in a Sales shock 
Variable All firms 
ln(inventory).L1 
 
0.401*** 
(0.0546) 
ln(sales) 
 
-1.165*** 
(0.3201) 
Layoff2*ln(sales) 
 
                  1.139*** 
                  (0.3952) 
Layoff3*ln(sales) 
 
1.122*** 
(0.3320) 
Layoff4*ln(sales) 
 
0.732** 
(0.3301) 
Layoff5*ln(sales) 
 
0.836** 
(0.3403) 
Note: This estimation is based on the equation (4-3). All standard errors are robust and reported 
in parentheses. *Significant at 10%.  **Significant at 5%.  ***Significant at 1%. 
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Table 10 Test for the (S, s) Model by Different Firm Sizes  
Variable All firms Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
ln(inventory).L1 0.223*** (0.0575) 
0.215** 
(0.0879) 
0.346*** 
(0.0565) 
0.303*** 
(0.105) 
ln(sales) 0.227*** (0.0282) 
0.213*** 
(0.0440) 
0.302*** 
(0.043) 
0.126** 
(0.0620) 
Fit 0.80 0.68 0.76 0.79 
N 4801 1369 2297 1135 
Note: This estimation is based on the equation (5-1). All standard errors are robust and reported 
in parentheses. The model fit is calculated using the square of the correlation between the 
observed and the predicted value. *Significant at 10%.  **Significant at 5%.  ***Significant at 
1%. 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 Test for the (S, s) Model by Different Industries  
Variable Mining Light Chemical Heavy Other 
ln(inventory).
L1 
 
0.360*** 
(0.0993) 
 
0.276*** 
(0.0771) 
 
0.259** 
(0.0890) 
 
-0.0195 
(0.0956) 
 
0.316*** 
(0.0923) 
ln(sales) 
 
0.458*** 
(0.1469) 
 
0.267*** 
(0.0686) 
 
0.237*** 
(0.0614) 
 
0.153*** 
(0.0409) 
 
0.310*** 
(0.0619) 
Fit 0.92 0.77 0.83 0.36 0.84 
N 290 1198 877 1862 574 
Note: This estimation is based on the equation (5-1). All standard errors are robust and reported 
in parentheses. The model fit is calculated using the square of the correlation between the 
observed and the predicted value. *Significant at 10%.  **Significant at 5%.  ***Significant at 
1%. 
56 
 
CHAPTER II 
PROCESS INNOVATION UNDER COMPETITION 
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 Abstract 
 
I analyze the relationship between process innovation and market competition. I 
find that increased competition will shrink the demand facing each firm, and firms will 
have less incentive for process innovation whether the innovation outcome is 
deterministic or stochastic. However, when the number of firms in the market is 
proportional to the demand and both increase, then increased price elasticity will induce 
firms to devote more effort to conduct process innovation when innovation is 
deterministic; and under the stochastic case, an inverted-U shape relation between 
innovation effort and market competitiveness is identified. Furthermore, when the 
number of firms is endogenous, innovation incentive grows with the size of the market. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The debate over the effect of increasing market competition on firms’ innovation 
activities has been controversial since Schumpeter (1934). Competition is one of a great 
many factors that affect a firm’s incentive to innovate, such as the market structure, the 
protection of property rights, the ability to license a patent, and uncertainty regarding 
innovation processes and so on. Market competition can interact with these other factors, 
but there is no single model that captures every aspect of innovation and competition, and 
therefore the theoretic literature arrives at no consensus regarding the effects of 
competition on innovation. 
While there are many models that examine the relation between innovation and 
competition, two polar views co-exist in the literature. Schumpeter (1934) argues that 
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monopoly is temporary, so a monopolist has an incentive to keep innovating to prevent 
the entrance of new firms. Furthermore, innovation is costly and risky, therefore only 
larger firms have the ability to conduct substantial research and development (R&D). A 
long line of literature has followed from this argument that less competition in the market 
provides better breeding grounds for innovation.26 On the other hand, Arrow (1962) 
assumes that monopolists have perfect protection of their innovations. He compares the 
incentives to innovate under both monopoly and competitive markets with a cost-
reducing innovation model, and finds that a monopolist has less incentive to innovate 
compared with firms in a competitive market. This is because monopoly has more pre-
innovation profit, and hence there is a negative relationship between innovation and 
monopoly power.  
Following these two classic views, various formal models have emerged to 
capture the effect of competition on innovation. Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980b) model a 
cost-reducing innovation in an oligopoly with N identical firms, and show that firms will 
invest less in innovation as the number of firms grows since the output per firm decreases. 
This is commonly referred as the “scale effect”. Greenstein and Ramey (1998) assume 
that consumers prefer new products to old ones, and a monopolist could use both new and 
old products to separate the customers in such a way as to earn more profits than a 
competitor who could only earn by selling a new product. Unlike Arrow (1962) where a 
monopolist loses pre-innovation profits as it replaces new products with old ones, in this 
                                            
 
 
 
26
 See Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980b), Gilbert and Newbery (1982), Greenstein and Ramey (1998). 
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model a monopolist will gain profits from both the old and new products, higher than 
profits in a competitive market. Thus, a monopolist will have a strong incentive to 
conduct innovation. 
Generally, the theoretical literature examines the relationship between innovation 
and competition while representing the level of competition simply as the number of 
firms which is assumed to be exogenous. However, the number of firms in a market is 
determined by market size, scale economies and other factors such as fixed costs and 
barriers to entry. Clearly, as the size of the market grows, more firms will typically enter 
the market to capture available profits. Thus, I argue an important step in this literature is 
to allow the number of firms to be endogenous in a free entry model with zero profit-
equilibrium. In this paper, I will first examine how competition affects innovation effort 
when the number of firms in the market is proportional to the demand. In this case, the 
number of firms grows proportionally with the size of the market so that the number of 
customers facing each firm stays the same. With this model I illustrate how competition 
affects innovation when neutralizing the scale effect. Then I analyze the effect of the 
competition on the innovation when there is a fixed cost involved in the production and 
thus the number of firms is endogenously determined by the zero-profit condition. 
Innovation is often classified into process innovation or product innovation. 
Process innovation reduces production costs through enhancing the efficiency of 
production line or management. Product innovation entails developing a new product 
which may create a new uncontested market, or, an improved version of a product for 
which consumers have higher willingness to pay. A large part of the literature studies the 
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effects of competition on innovation while assuming the innovation outcome could be 
patented or licensed in the model.27 However, unlike product innovation which is likely 
patentable, process innovation is likely to be an ongoing process, and very firm-specific. 
Each firm must exert costly effort to improve their production line and lower its marginal 
cost.  
This cost-reducing innovation process is analogous to some models of managerial 
efficiency, in which managers exert costly effort to reduce the firm’s marginal production 
cost, and this outcome is firm-specific and nontransferable. Willig (1987) illustrates that 
increased competition will reduce the output scale of each firm which leaves managers 
less incentive to put forth effort because the value of reducing the marginal cost of 
production falls as scale falls. However it will also increase the price elasticity of demand 
which induces managers to exert more effort. So the total effect is ambiguous. Schmidt 
(1997) finds ambiguous results as well. But instead of relying on increasing price 
elasticity, he argues that greater competition will increase the risk of bankruptcy so that 
managers are forced to work hard to prevent liquidation.  
Martin (1993) develops a model to analyze the firm’s managerial efficiency in a 
Cournot market setting. He assumes an inverse linear demand function and the managers 
exert costly effort to reduce the firm’s marginal cost. Like Willig, he finds that increased 
competition will result in scale and elasticity effects in opposing directions. In his model 
he finds that the scale effect dominates so that the managerial effort will fall when the 
                                            
 
 
 
27
 Kamien, Oren and Tauman (1992) study a cost-reducing innovation which could be licensed, and then be 
auctioned or sold at a flat fee. 
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number of firms increases. I employ a similar model in this paper with some revisions. 
Firms first exert costly effort by which the marginal cost is determined, and then play a 
Cournot game. A linear demand function is straightforward and is convenient for 
modeling the size of the market which is determined by the slope. A firm’s marginal cost 
is an inverse function of innovation effort to represent process innovation as a cost 
reducing strategy.  
Unlike models of managerial effort, I model the possibility that innovation is a 
stochastic process. A principle-agent (P-A) setting is not considered in this paper because 
I focus on firm-level incentives. Martin (1993) acknowledges that the P-A framework 
was not critical to his findings, and Bertoletti and Poletti (1996) reexamine Martin's 
model and show that the results hold in a complete information model, and decreasing 
effort with increased competition is driven by increasing return to scale rather than the 
asymmetric information between owners and managers. 
There are two main findings. When an innovation process is deterministic, an 
exogenous increase in the number of firms has a dominant scale effect, and this increased 
competition reduces the incentive for process innovation (consistent with Martin’s result). 
However, when the number of firms in the market grows proportionally to the demand, or 
when the number of firms is endogenously determined in a zero-profit equation, the scale 
effect is diminished and increased price elasticity dominates. In this case the increased 
competition resulting from a larger market will induce firms to put more effort into 
innovation.  
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If the innovation process is stochastic, somewhat different results are obtained. 
When the number of firms is exogenous, firms have less incentive for process innovation 
as before. However, when the number of firms in the market grows proportionally to the 
demand, I find that there will be an inverted-U shape relation between innovation effort 
and market competitiveness. It is intuitive to think that a moderate level of competition 
may best promote innovation. When there is very intense competition, the small scale of 
firms may lead to little benefit from a new technology, especially for one that reduces 
costs rather than opens a new market. However, innovation incentive may be dull in very 
concentrated markets because failure to innovate may not reduce the market share 
significantly. Most of the literature predicts that the relation between innovation and 
competition is monotonic with greatest innovation occurring either with monopoly or 
perfect competition.28 However, I obtain the result that moderate level of competition 
produces the strongest incentive for innovation when the process is stochastic and the 
number of firms is proportional to market size.  
Moreover, when the number of firms is endogenous due to the existence of a 
fixed cost, I show that the number of firms will increase but not proportionally with the 
size of the market. Thus this creates a stronger incentive to exert effort for innovation 
under increasing competition in this model than when the number of firms proportionally 
changes with the size of the market.  
                                            
 
 
 
28
 Kamien and Schwartz (1976) suggest that innovation and competition has an inverted U relation. Aghion 
et. al.(2005) assumes that there is a spatial sequence structure finds that firms will devote more effort in 
innovation when more firms enter the market at low levels of competition, but they will lose incentives to 
innovate at high competition levels 
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The reminder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Second 2.2, the basic 
model is set up and analyzed under different assumptions regarding innovation process 
and the exogeneity or endogeneity of the number of firms. A summary of the results is 
presented in Section 2.3. 
2.2 The model 
2.2.1 The deterministic innovation model 
2.2.1.1 The basic model 
 
In the model presented below and in the next few sections, I denote n as the 
number of firms in the market, P as market price, q as each firm’s output and Q as the 
market output. I also use e as innovation effort, MC as firm’s marginal cost and F as 
fixed cost. I begin by assuming a market with an exogenous determined number of firms, 
n. Each firm chooses his own output to maximize profit. The demand function is 
[  1  \] where b represents the size of the market. When b doubles, the size of the 
market will be one half as the original size. This simple linear demand function is both 
trackable and facilitates examining the effect of competition on innovation when the 
number of firms varies with the size of the market as discussed later. 
Firm i will put costly effort ei to conduct process innovation which will reduce the 
marginal cost MC`. Once the firm chooses innovation effort, the marginal cost MC is 
constant and inversely related with effort, MC 4ab where 0 + K. c 1. The cost for 
process innovation is dK., where d’ f 0, d’’ f 0, denoting that the return on R&D is 
decreasing with effort. 
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The firms’ problem is then to choose the output and effort to maximize their 
profits: 
Yghb,ab i.  j. k1  \]  11  K.l  dK.                                                           2.1.1 
The first order conditions are: 
9i.9j.  1  \j.  \].  11  K.  j. n \  0                                          2.1.2 9i.9K.  j. n 11  K.  doK.  0                                                                      2.1.3 
Rearrange equation (2.1.2) to obtain 
j.  1  \].  11  K.2\                                                                                         2.1.4 
Since the firms are identical, I assume symmetry for j., that is j  j   j.   jp, thus equation (2.1.4) will be  
j.n  1  11  K.2\    1j.n2                                                                             2.1.5 
Solving for j.n yileds:     
j.n  1  11  K.  1\                                                                                                      2.1.6 
Substitute equation (2.1.6) into equation (2.1.3), and rearrange to find 
  1\doK.n  K.n1  K.n                                                                               2.1.7 
To examine the effect of competition on innovation effort, I take the partial 
derivative of equation (2.1.7) with respect to n to find: 
65 
 
\doK.n    1\dooK.n 9K.n9
 1  K.n  K.n n 3 n 1  K.n1  K.n  9K.n9                                                           2.1.8 
Simplifying and rearranging the above equation yields: 
 1  2K.n1  K.n    1\dooK.n 9K.n9  \doK.n                                             2.1.9 
From assumption, b and doK.n are both positive, so the right hand side of 
equation (2.1.9) is positive. Let A= abn4abnU    1\dooK.n which is the terms in the 
parentheses on the left hand side, the sign of the comparative statistics of AabnAp  is the same 
as the sign of A. 
Since there is  dooK.n in A, the Hessian Matrix of the second order condition for 
profit maximization will be evaluated. 
 The hession matrix v  w AxyAhy AxyAhAaAxyAaAh AxyAay w  must be negative definite for a unique 
max to exist, where 
9i9j  \  \  2\ 
9i9j9K  11  K.n 9i9K9j  11  K.n 9i9K  2jn 11  K.n  dooK.n 
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Thus, AxyAhy n AxyAay  AxyAhAa n AxyAaAh  2\(2jn 4abnX  dooK.n  4abnU must be 
positive to ensure the hession matrix is negative definite. 
From 2\(2jn 4abnX  dooK.n  4abnU f 0, I identify an inequality condition for dooK.n 
dooK.n f 12\1  K.n  2jn1  K.n                                                              2.1.10 
Substitute equation (2.1.10) into A to find: 
z c 1  2K.n1  K.n    1\ k 12\1  K.n  2jn1  K.n l 
Substitute equation (2.1.6) into the right hand side of the above equation to obtain: 
z c 1  2K.n1  K.n    121  K.n  21 
11  K.n1  K.n   
Simplifying the above equation yields: 
z c 1  21  K.n  
Since there is at least one firm in the market, the right hand side is nonpositive, so A is 
strictly less than zero. 
Thus AabnAp c 0 
This result that innovation effort declines with n can be illustrated graphically. I 
plot   1\doK.n and abn4abnX on the same graph where the X-axis is effort to give us a 
picture of the comparative statistics of AabnAp . When the number of firms in the market n 
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increases,   1\doK.n rotates to the left, and the intersection of these two equations 
shifts to the left, and hence the optimal level of K. decreases. 
 
Figure 10 Plot of Equation (2.1.7) 
Thus, when the number of firms n increase, the increased competition will shrink 
the demand facing individual firms, and firms will put less effort into process innovation.  
Proposition 1: Firms will engage in less process innovation as the number of 
firms in the market increases when the market size is fixed. 
2.2.1.2 Scale neutral model 
A more complete model of the competition and the incentive for innovation must 
account for how the number of firms is determined. A larger market supports more firms. 
In this section, I will examine the effect of competition on innovation when the number 
of firms in the market is proportional to the size of the market. This treatment neutralizes 
68 
 
the scale effect which is dominant in the basic model when the number of firms is 
exogenous.  
I represent a market where the number of firms is proportional to the size of the 
market by employing the demand function [  1  }p ]. Here b is a fixed parameter and 
the demand curve becomes flatter as n grows. In this case, the number of customers per 
firm is constant as the size of the market and number of firms change. Holding other 
assumptions the same and resolving the model, I obtain  
k1  1l \doK.n  K.n1  K.n                                                                          2.1.11 
Similarly, to examine the effect of competition on innovation effort, I take the 
partial derivative of equation (2.1.11) with respect to n to obtain: 
\ doK.n    1 n  \ n doK.n    1 \ dooK.n 9K.n9
 1  K.n  K.n n 3 n 1  K.n1  K.n  9K.n9                            2.1.12 
Simplifying and rearranging the above equation to find: 
~ 1  2K.n1  K.n    1 \ dooK.n 9K.n9   \ doK.n                               2.1.13 
b and doK.n are both positive, so the right hand side of equation (2.1.13) is 
negative. Let B= abn4abnU    1 }p dooK.n which is the terms in the parentheses on the 
left hand side, the sign of the comparative statistics of AabnAp  is opposite with the sign of B. 
Solving Hessian Matrix for this model and I obtain an inequality condition for dooK.n 
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dooK.n f 2\1  K.n  2jn1  K.n                                                             2.1.14 
Substituting equation (2.1.14) and the profit maximizing output qninto B, and simplifying 
to find: 
 c 1  21  K.n  
This term is exactly the same as A in the basic model, and it is strictly less than zero. 
Thus AabnAp f 0 
 
 
Figure 11 Plot of Equation (2.1.11) 
Figure 11 is the plot of equation (2.1.11). When the number of firms n increases, 
the curve of 1  p \doK.n will shift downwards, and the intersection for the optimal 
level of effort will increase. In this case, the number of firms in the market is proportional 
70 
 
to the demand, that is, the number of customers per firm remains the same. However as n 
grows, price elasticity increases and firms conduct greater process innovation. 
Proposition 2: When the number of firms is proportional to demand with the 
customers per firm remaining the same, the price elasticity effect dominates. Firms will 
devote more effort to process innovation as the number of firms and market size grow. 
2.2.1.3 Endogenous number of firms 
In this section, I assume the number of firms is endogenous and constrained by 
nonnegative profits. A fixed cost F is introduced. Solving for nonnegative profit 
constraint I will find the number of firms is a function of effort and fixed cost. 
i.n  j.n k1  \]n  11  K.nl  dK.n    0                                         2.1.15 
Substitute equation (2.1.6) into the above equation to obtain: 
1  11  K.n  1\ 1   n 1 
11  K.n  1  11  K.n    dK.n 
Multiplying terms, this expression becomes 
K.n1  K.n  1\ 1    1 
1  K.n  1  11  K.n    dK.n 
Summing terms in parentheses yields 
71 
 
K.n1  K.n  1\  1  1 
11  K.n  1     dK.n 
The left hand side then reduces to 
 K.n1  K.n  1\    dK.n 
Isolating the term containing n gives us  
  1 +  K.n1  K.n  dK.n\ 
Finally, when this expression holds with equality, this defines n* as  
n  K.n1  K.n  dK.n\  1                                                                                 2.1.16 
This expression must hold such that K.n is the profit maximizing effort and j.n the 
profit maximizing output given there are n* firms exist in the market. This defines the 
relationship between n* and e*.  When the fixed cost increases, the number of firms will 
decrease. Moreover, when the size of the market doubles, n increases but to less than 
twice the original number. In this case, the number of firms will increase but not 
proportionally with the size of the market. 
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I substitute equation (2.1.16) into expression for q*, which is equation (2.1.6), to 
indentify q* as only a function of fixed cost F, the size of the market b, and the effort e, 
and the effort cost function c(e).  
j.n  1  11  K.  1\ 
K.1  K.K.1  K.  dK.\ n \
   dK.\                             2.1.17 
Insert equation 2.1.16 into (2.1.7) yields: K.1  K.  dK.\ \do  K.
n1  K.n                       
This expression implicitly defines e* as a function of all exogenous factors. 
Simplifying this expression becomes 
\ n doK.n  dK.  11  K.n                         dK.  1  K.n n doK.n n \                                                  2.1.18 
To see how the optimal effort level change in response to the size of the market b 
changes, taking partial derivative of equation (2.1.18) with respect to b to obtain: 
41  K.n AabnA} n doK.n n \  1  K.n n 2doK.n n dooK.n n AabnA} n \ 
1  K.n n doK.n  doK.n n AabnA}                    
Rearrange to find: 
4\1  K.n n doK.n  2\doK.n n dooK.n1  K.n  doK.n AabnA} 1  K.n n doK.n                                                                                    2.1.19                   
73 
 
The right hand side of the equation (2.1.19) is negative, and let   4\1 
K.n n doK.n  2\doK.n n dooK.n1  K.n  doK.n, the sign of the comparative 
statistics of AabnA}  should be opposite with the sign of C. 
Substitute the inequality condition (2.1.10) for dooK.n into C to obtain   f 4\1  K.n n doK.n
 2\doK.n n  12\1  K.n  2doK.n1  K.n  1  K.n  doK.n 
The right hand side is then 4\1  K.n n doK.n  doK.n  4\1  K.n ndoK.n  doK.n  0 
So C is strictly positive, and thus AabnA} c 0 
That is to say, when the size of the market increases, the number of firms in the 
market increases as well but not proportionally, firms will face more demand, and put 
more effort in the R&D research for process innovation. 
Proposition 3: When the number of firms is endogenous, firms will devote more 
effort for process innovation if the size of the market increases making it more 
competitive. 
2.2.2 The stochastic innovation model 
2.2.2.1 The basic model 
  
The innovation function is deterministic in the basic model, but innovation is 
often an uncertain process, and a firm may achieve nothing despite significant effort, or 
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achieve success without great effort. In this section I model a stochastic innovation 
process.  
Again, I first assume there are n identical firms in the market, and demand 
function is [  1  \]. In period 1, firms choose their innovation effort, which, if 
successful, will reduce the marginal cost. For trackability, I assume there are two possible 
levels of marginal cost for each firm i, .  5, 5, and 0 c 5 c 5 c 1. The probability 
of being a low type is a function of effort, D\.  5  1K., where f’>0, f’’<0, 
f(0)=0. In period 2, firms realize their own marginal cost which is observable to all firms 
in the market. And in period 3, firms play an asymmetric Cournot game to choose the 
output to maximize their profits. 
This is a sequential game so I solve this model backwards. In period 3, firm i 
faces a market with m low types and n-m-1 high types.  
Suppose that at time 3 firm i is a low type, then there are m+1 low types and n-m-
1 high types in the market, and the firm chooses the quantity to maximize the profits: 
Ygh i  j1  \]  5 
The first order condition is: 
9i9j  1  \]  5  j n \  0                                                              2.2.1 
Imposing symmetry, 
]    1j      1j                                                                 2.2.2 
Substitute equation (2.2.2) into (2.2.1) to obtain 
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1  \  1j      1j&  5  \j
 1  \  2j  \    1j  5  0 
jn  1  5\  2      1  2 jn                                                                      2.2.3 
For high type firms, their problem is 
Ygh i  j1  \]  5 
The first order condition is: 
9i9j  1  \]  5  j n \  0 1  \  1j      1j&  5  \j  1  \  1j  \  j  5 0 
jn  1  5\      1   jn                                                                            2.2.4 
Substitute (2.2.4) into (2.2.3) to find 
jn  1\  1 1    5      15&                                        2.2.5 
Substitute (2.2.5) into (2.2.4) yileds 
jn  1\  1 1    15    25&                                                2.2.6 
 when  +   1, jn  is nonnegative. Thus I will assume  +   1 to ensure 
there is no corner solution in this Cournot game. That is, I assume innovation is not so 
dramatic that firms which fail to innovate will exit market. 
Substitute (2.2.5) and (2.2.6) into (2.2.2) to obtain 
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]n  1\  1     15      15&                   
Thus,  
in  1\  1 1    5      15&                                    2.2.7 
[n  1  ]n  1  1\  1     15      15&              2.2.8     
Now suppose at time 3 firm i is high type. Then there are m low types and n-m 
high types in the market, and the firm chooses the quantity to maximize the profits: 
Ygh i  j1  \]  5 
The first order condition is: 
9i9j  1  \]  5  j n \  0                                                            2.2.9  
Imposing symmetry,  
]  j    j                                                                                     2.2.10 
Substitute (2.2.10) into (2.2.9) to find 
1  \j    j&  5  \j  1  \j  \    1j  5  0 
jn  1  5\    1      1 jn                                                             2.2.11 
For low type firms, their problem is 
Ygh i  j1  \]  5 
The first order condition is: 
9i9j  1  \]  5  j n \  0                                                              2.2.12 
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1  \j    j&  5  \j  1  \  1j  \  j  5  0 
jn  1  5\  1      1 jn                                                                              2.2.13 
Substitute (2.2.13) into (2.2.11) to obtain 
jn  1\  1 1  5    15&                                                            2.2.14 
Substitute (2.2.14) into (2.2.13) yields 
jn  1\  1 1      15    5&                                        2.2.15 
Substitute (2.2.14) and (2.2.15) into (2.2.10) to find 
]n  1\  1   5    5&                   
Thus,  
in  1\  1 1  5    15                                                      2.2.16  
[n  1  ]n  1  1\  1   5    5&                                2.2.17  
Combining results from these two cases , for firm i between being high and low 
type, given there are m other firms are low, the difference of the profits between low type 
and high type firms is  
   in  in  \  1 5  52    25    2  25
 \  1 5  52  5    25
 2\  1 5  5                                                             2.2.18 
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Let   1K., and assume the realization of the marginal cost for each firm is 
independent, so all combinations of the MCs for all firms follow a binomial distribution. 
   k  10 l 31  p n  0  k  11 l 1  p n  1
   k  1 l ¡1  p¡ n    
 k  1  1l p1  3 n    1
 \  1 5  52  5    25  2\  1 5  50
n k  10 l 31  p  1 n k  11 l 1  p    ¢
n k  1 l ¡1  p¡      1 k  1  1l p1  3& 
Since ¢ n p¡  ¡1  p¡  ¢ n p!¡!np¡! ¡1  p¡  pnp!¡!np¡!  n
¡1  p¡    1 n p¡ ¡1  p¡ 
and ∑ p. ¡1  p¡p¡  1 
I find  
   p}p4y 5  52  5    25  p}p4y 5  5  1 
p}p4y 5  52  5    25  2  15  5                        2.2.19) 
In period 1, firm i chooses its effort to maximize the expected profit:  
Ygab in  K. 
Where  in  1K.in  1  1K.in   1K.   in  
The first order condition is then: 
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1¥K.n   1                                                                                                                 2.2.20 
Substitute the expression of   into the above equation to solve for ei*, and impose 
symmetry, K.n  K.n , " obatin  
p}p4y 5  52  5    25  2  11K.n5  51oK.n  12.2.21   
The number of firms in the market captures the competiveness in this case, and in order 
to examine the relation between innovation and competition, I take partial derivative of 
equation (2.2.21) with respect to the number of firms n to find: 
1ooK.n 9K.n9  n  1¥K.n9 n9  9 n91K.n n 1¥K.n n 9K.n9   0                
where  n  p}p4y 5  52  5    25  2  11K.n5  5  2.2.22 
Rearrange yields: 
1ooK.n n  1oK.n 9 n91K.n 9K.n9  1¥K.n 9 n9                   2.2.23  
Since 1oK.n f 0 YZ 1ooK.n c 0 by assumption, and I could get 
AB§nA¨abn   p}p4y 2  15  5 c 0 from equation (2.2.22), thus 1ooK.n n 
1oK.n AB§nA¨abn,  which is on the left hand side of the eqation 2.2.23, is negatvie. 
To find the sign of AB§nAp , I take the difference of  n when the number of firms is n 
and n+1. 
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 pn    p4n 
 \  1 5  52  5    25  2  15  5
   1\  2 5  52    15    15  25  5
 5  5\  1  2   22  25  5  5
 25  5  25  5
   12  25  5  5  5  5  25  5
 5  5\  1  2     12  25
     15  5      125  5
 2  25  5    15  5
 5  5\  1  2 2  2  21  5    15  5
     15  5
 6  10  15  5&                              
Since  +   1,   15  5 + 1  5 
  15  5 +   11  5 
Thus  pn    p4n   }p4yp4y 2  2  21  5    11  5 2155621015555\12222315215562
10155f0                            
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Therefore, the right hand side of the equation (2.2.23) is positive, and hence AabnAp c 0. 
This result is the same with the deterministic case. 
Proposition 4a: The more firms in the market, the less efforts firms will put to conduct 
process innovation even when the innovation result is stochastic. Scale effect dominates. 
To examine the effect of  market competiveness on the expected price, I 
calculated the expected price and take partial derivative with respect to the number of 
firms n: 
The expected price [n
 1  0 31  p ¬ 1  1   5­
 1 1  p ¬ 1  1   5    15­  
 k¢ l ¡1  p¡ ¬ 1  1   ¢5    ¢5­  
  p1  3 ¬ 1  1   5­
 1    1  1  1  k¢ l ¡1  p¡¢5    ¢5p¡3  
Since ¢ n p¡ ¡1  p5  ¢ n p!¡!np¡! ¡1  p¡5  pnp!¡!np¡!  n
¡1  p¡5  5 n p¡ ¡1  p¡ 
and ∑ p¡ ¡1  p¡p¡  1 
I find ∑ p¡ ¡1  p¡p¡3 ¢5  5 
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Analogously, ∑ p¡ ¡1  p¡p¡3   ¢5  5  5 
Thus,  
[n  1    1  1  1 5  5  5
 1  1 1  5  5  5                                          2.2.24 
Taking partial derivative with respect to the number of firms n: 
9[n9  5  5  5  1  1  5  5  5  1
 5  5  5  1  1                                                                 2.2.25  
Since 5 c 5 c 1, 
9[n9 c 0 
That is to say, the expected price will decrease when the number of firms in the market 
increases. 
Proposition 4b: The expected price will decrease as the number of firms in the 
market increases when the innovation result is stochastic. 
2.2.2.2 Scale neutral model 
As I did earlier in the deterministic innovation model, I now assume the number 
of firms in the market is proportional to the size of the market. In order to neutralize the 
scale effect, the demand function then becomes [  1  }p ]. Holding other assumptions 
the same with the basic model, resolving the profits maximization problem in period 3 to 
obtain  
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 n  py}p4y 5  52  5    25  2  11K.n5  5 2.2.26) 
In period 1, firm i chooses the effort to maximize the expected profit:  
Ygab in  K. 
The first order condition and the comparative statistics are the same with the basic model 
expect the functional form of EZn is slightly different: 
 1¥K.n n  1                                                                                                2.2.20 
1ooK.n n  1oK.n 9 n91K.n 9K.n9  1¥K.n 9 n9                   2.2.23  
As before, 1ooK.n n  1oK.n AB§nA¨abn is negative. To examine the sign of 
AB§nAp , I take the difference of  n when the number of firms is n and n+1, but this 
cannot be signed in general. I conducted a simulation to show how market 
competitiveness affects the optimal level of innovation effort in this model.   
I first calculate the expected values of jn, jn  YZ ]n, and run simulation to 
examine the relation between those quantities and the number of firms. 
When there are m low types firms and n-m high types firms in the market,  
jn  \  1 1      15    5&                                                          
jn  \  1 1  5    15&                                                                             
]n  \  1   5    5&                   
Let Y  1K, and assume the realization of the marginal cost for each firm is 
independent, so all combinations of the MCs for all firms follow a binomial distribution. 
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jn   k¢ l Y¡1  Yp¡jnp¡3
 \  1 1    na  15    
   Y5&                                         
E(jn   p}p4 1  Y5  Y  15&                                                                             
]n  \  1   Y5    Y5&                   
Figures 12-15 are the simulation results given the functional form 1K.  1 KgK.. Figure 12 shows that there is an inverted-U shape relationship between the 
number of firms in the market and innovation effort. Starting from a small market and 
few firms, as market size and the number of firms grow together, firms exert more 
innovation effort; However, as market size and the number of firms become large, 
eventually firms will have less incentive to engage in process innovation because there 
are likely to be many successful innovations in the market and thus little realized profit 
even for these firms.  
Figures 13-15 show that when the number of firms increases, low type firms will 
produce more and the market output will increase. However, high type firms will produce 
more when there are a few firms in the market, but as there are more and more firms in 
the market, the optimal quantity for the high type firms will decrease. 
I tried different functional forms of fK., and also changed the parameter value of 
for 1 5, 5  and \ robustness check, and obtain the similar results. As is evident from 
simulation, AabnAp  cannot be signed in general. 
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Figure 12 The Effect of Market Competitiveness on Innovation Effort When the 
Number of Firms is Proportional to the Size of the Market 
 
Figure 13 The Effect of Market Competitiveness on the Expected Output of Low 
Type Firms When the Number of Firms is Proportional to the Size of the Market 
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Figure 14 The Effect of Market Competitiveness on the Expected Output of High 
Type Firms When the Number of Firms is Proportional to the Size of the Market 
 
Figure 15 The Effect of Market Competitiveness on the Expected Output of All 
Firms When the Number of Firms is Proportional to the Size of the Market 
Proposition 5: When the number of firms is proportional to the demand and 
innovation result is stochastic, there is an inverted-U shape relationship between the 
number of firms in the market and innovation effort. That is, firms will exert more 
innovation effort in a small market competing with a few firms; however, as there are 
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more and more firms entering the market, firms will have less incentive to conduct 
process innovation. 
2.2.2.3 Endogenous number of firms 
I now assume there is a fixed cost F for each firm, and the number of firms in the 
market is endogenous.  
in  1K. n  in    
where   in  }p4y 1  5    15                                                       2.2.16            
 n  p}p4y 5  52  5    25  21K.  15  5      2.2.21) 
Solving for in to obtain  
in  }p4y ±21K.1  55   5  1  5  1K. 11K121K2&552         2.2.27) 
Solving for nonnegative profit constraintin  K.  0, I will find the number 
of firms is a function of effort, fixed cost, 5, 5  and \. 
In period 1, firm i chooses the effort to maximize the expected profit:  
Ygab in  K. 
The first order condition is: 
 1¥K.n n  1                                                                                                    2.2.20 
Solving K.n from equation 2.2.20to obtain K.n is a function of fixed 
cost, 5, 5  and \. 
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I couldn’t obtain the analytic results for AabnA} , so I used simulation to see how the 
size of the market affect innovation effort. 
Analogously, I calculate the expected values of jn, jn  YZ ]n, and run simulation 
to examine the relation between quantities and the number of firms. 
When there are m low types firms and n-m high types firms in the market,  
jn  1\n  1 1  n    15
 n  5&                                                          
jn  1\n  1 1  5    15&                                                                             
]n  1\n  1 n  5  n  5&                   
Let Y  1K, and assume the realization of the marginal cost for each firm is 
independent, so all combinations of the MCs for all firms follow a binomial distribution. 
jn  1\n  1 1  n  na  15     n  nY5&                                        
E(jn  
}pn4 1  nY5  nY  15&                                                                             
]n  1\n  1 n  nY5  n  nY5&                   
Figures 16-20 are the simulation results assuming the functional form 1K. 1  KgK.. Figures 16 and 17show that when the size of the firms in the market 
increases, the number of firms increases but less than proportionally, and firms will put 
more effort for innovation. Note that fixed cost F is sufficiently large that high cost firms 
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stay in the market. Figures 18-20 present the effect of market competitiveness on the 
expected output, and the results are similar to what I found in the last model. I did 
robustness check as well with alternative functional forms, and similar results are 
obtained. 
 
Figure 16 The Effect of the Market Size on the Number of Firms in Equilibrium 
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Figure 17 The Effect of the Market Size on Innovation Effort When the Number of 
Firms is Endogenous 
 
 
Figure 18 The Effect of the Market Size on the Expected Output of Low Type Firms 
When the Number of Firms is Endogenous 
 
 
Figure 19 The Effect of the Market Size on the Expected Output of High Type 
Firms When the Number of Firms is Endogenous 
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Figure 20 The Effect of the Market Size on the Expected Output of All Firms When 
the Number of Firms is Endogenous 
Proposition 6: When the number of firms is endogenous, firms will devote more 
effort for process innovation as the size of the market increases when the innovation 
result is stochastic. 
Compared with proposition 5 where firms will exert more innovation effort in a 
small market competing with a few firms, but have less incentive to conduct process 
innovation as there are more and more firms in the market, in this case, firms will 
definitely devote more effort for process innovation as competition increases due to 
increasing market size. That is because, the model that delivers proposition 5 assumes the 
number of firms proportionally increases with the size of the market, but in the model 
with proposition 6, I show that with a fixed cost, the number of firms will increase but 
less than proportionally with the size of the market. Holding other conditions the same, 
customers each firm will be more for the model with a fixed cost. Thus firms will have 
stronger incentive to put more effort for innovation when there is more competition for 
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the model with endogenous number of firms due to a fixed cost than the model where the 
number of firms changes proportionally with the size of the market.  
2.3 Conclusion 
Since Schumpeter pointed out that innovative activity is related to competition, 
economists have developed various models to examine this relationship. However, there 
is no paper so far considering endogenous number of firms in the model, and 
deterministic innovation process is commonly assumed. In this paper, I employed a 
model similar to Martin’s managerial efficiency model. I compared the results from the 
models with exogenous and endogenous number of firms, and innovation process is 
assumed to be either deterministic or stochastic. I find that when innovation process is 
deterministic, the basic results are consistent with Martin (1993). As the number of firms 
is exogenous, increased competition will shrink the demand facing each firm, and firms 
then have less incentive for process innovation. However, when the market could support 
more firms, such as the number of firms in the market grows proportional to the demand, 
or the number of firms is endogenous due to a fixed cost, the scale effect is diminished, 
and increased price elasticity dominates in this case which will induce firms to put more 
effort into innovation. Thus more competition will induce firms to devote more effort in 
innovation. 
When innovation process is stochastic, ambiguous results are obtained when the 
number of firms in the market grows proportional to the demand. I find that there will be 
an inverted-U shape relation between innovation effort and market competitiveness. 
Moreover, when the number of firms is endogenous due to a fixed cost, I show that the 
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number of firms will increase but not proportionally with the size of the market, and 
firms will have stronger inventive to put more effort for innovation under increasing 
competition for the model with endogenous number of firms due to fixed cost than the 
model where the number of firms changes proportionally with the size of the market.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this dissertation, I examine firm’s behavior from the manager’s view. In 
chapter one, I examine inventory behavior using Chinese firm level data. By analyzing 
the original production smoothing/buffer stock model, ambiguous relation between sales 
shock and inventory investment are obtained. In addition, the labor force is found to be a 
crucial component of the model and excluding it from the estimation leads to biased 
results. To date, this is the first paper that considers the impact of the labor force in the 
empirical test of inventory behavior. Using a rich Chinese firm-level dataset covering 769 
manufacturing firms from 1980 to 1989, finished goods inventory is used to test the 
production smoothing/buffer stock model which involves the rising marginal cost when 
planning production, while inventory of raw materials is applied to test the (S ,s) model 
assuming a fixed delivery cost.  I find that the variance of the annual gross output is 
smaller than that of the sales revenues of products. In particular, small firms in heavy 
industry show strong evidence to use inventory to smooth production and buffer demand 
shocks.  Moreover, sales are positively correlated with investment in raw materials, but 
negatively correlated with finished goods inventory in most cases. This is consistent with 
the predictions from both the production smoothing/buffer stock model and the (S, s) 
model. Furthermore, the labor force is found to be positively related with demand as well 
as the inventory, which indicates that excluding the labor force in the estimation will 
cause biased results. This explains why previous studies found contradicting results to the 
theoretical predictions.  
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In chapter two, the relation between innovative activity and market competition is 
modeled and analyzed. I employed a model similar to Martin’s managerial efficiency 
model. I compared the results from the models with exogenous and endogenous number 
of firms, and innovation process is assumed to be either deterministic or stochastic. I find 
that when innovation process is deterministic, the basic results are consistent with Martin 
(1993). As the number of firms is exogenous, increased competition will shrink the 
demand facing each firm, and firms then have less incentive for process innovation. 
However, when the market could support more firms, such as the number of firms in the 
market grows proportional to the demand, or the number of firms is endogenous due to a 
fixed cost, the scale effect is diminished, and increased price elasticity dominates in this 
case which will induce firms to put more effort into innovation. Thus more competition 
will induce firms to devote more effort in innovation. 
When innovation process is stochastic, ambiguous results are obtained when the 
number of firms in the market grows proportional to the demand. I find that there will be 
an inverted-U shape relation between innovation effort and market competitiveness. 
Moreover, when the number of firms is endogenous due to a fixed cost, I show that the 
number of firms will increase but not proportionally with the size of the market, and 
firms will have stronger inventive to put more effort for innovation under increasing 
competition for the model with endogenous number of firms due to fixed cost than the 
model where the number of firms changes proportionally with the size of the market.  
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